Abstract-We study the identification capacity of classicalquantum channels ("cq-channels") under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we first consider compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper by considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then the secrecy identification capacity is also zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC) with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.
correctly, the receiver still can decide what message had been sent, at least with a high probability.
In the theory of identification, the receiver is not interested in the exact message, but only wants to know if the sent message is equal to a particular one that he is interested in. Of course, the sender does not know in which message the receiver is interesting. It was shown that there are codes for classical channels with double exponential size in the block length of the codewords. In identification theory, one considers also models in which several receivers receive the same transmission but are interested in different one messages. Applications for identification codes can be found in the theory of digital watermarks [3] , [31] and communication complexity [38] .
Investigation into communication via quantum channels started in the 1960s. We refer the reader to the book [41] for more details on quantum and classical channels and the various transmission capacities associated with them, including their history.
Löber [30] was the first to consider identification via classical-quantum channels (so-called cq-channels). He introduced two generalizations of the classical identification codes. First he defined identification codes for cq-channels where the receiver has a binary measurement for each possible message he could be interested in. Crucially, in quantum mechanics, these measurements may be incompatible, meaning that one cannot identify several messages at the same time. In certain applications, this is an undesirable feature, when there are many receivers each wanting to identify "their" message. To address this, Löber formulated a second model, that of a simultaneous ID-code, for which there has to be one single (simultaneous) measurement that allows us to identify every message at the same time. This model is also valid if the one who performs the measurement is not the ultimate receiver, and in particular, does not know in which message this receiver is interested. There are many examples where identification schemes require simultaneous ID-codes because their real implementation would consist of many receivers at a time (for examples see [4] ). This is not always the case [28] if both sender and receiver have a (possibly different) text and they want to check if it is the same one, using an ID-code. Here, only one receiver is asking only one question.
In the present paper, we consider both secure and robust models of cq-channels. Our coding schemes are all simultaneous, but we will prove converses in the general, non-simultaneous setting. With this, we characterize the 0018-9448 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
identification and the simultaneous identification capacity. Here, these two capacities turn out to be the same. Security is modeled by a channel with an eavesdropper, called a wiretap cqq-channel. It is connecting a sender with two receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper. The legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel. A code for the channel conveys information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper knows nothing about the transmitted information. The classical degraded form of this channel was introduced by Wyner [45] , who determined the secrecy capacity of this channel. The classical non-degraded model was presented and solved in [20] . The wiretap cqq-channel was considered in [19] and in [21] .
To model the robustness aspect, we consider compound cq-channels, which are described as a set of memoryless channels. Before the start of the transmission, a channel is chosen unknown to the sender or receiver, and used during the transmission of one codeword. The code of the sender and the receiver has to be robust and therefore independent of the chosen model. The classical channel model was introduced by Blackwell, Breiman, and Thomasian [10] . The compound cq-channel was considered in [8] , [18] , and [32] .
There exist many combinations of these concepts. The classical compound wiretap channel was considered in [9] and [29] . The transmission capacity of the compound wiretap cqq-channel was given in [11] . For an overview we refer to the wide ranging textbook by Wilde [41] , which only omits the theory of identification over quantum channels. An overview on this topic can be found in [43] . In [16] we gave the identification capacities for the classical compound channel and the classical compound wiretap channel. Therefore, the present paper is a generalization to the classical-quantum case.
The structure of our paper is as follows. We start in Section II with the basic definitions of cq-channels and of transmission and identification via cq-channels; we review the main result of [30] and [6] where the identification capacity of cq-channels were given. We generalize this result in Section III for identification via compound cq-channels. In Section IV, we define how to add the wiretapper to the model, define wiretap cqq-channels and give their capacity, and we prove a dichotomy theorem for its secure identification capacity. We generalize this result in Section V for the secure identification capacity of a compound wiretap cqq-channel, i.e. we prove a capacity theorem for secure and robust identification via quantum channels. In Section VI we assume that the channel state can change after each qubit transmitted by the sender. We assume that this action comes from a jammer and consider the worst case. In Section VII we also add a wiretapper to this model. We give the capacity for both models. Finally, in Section VIII we analyze the calculated capacities as functions of the channel parameter.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND RESULTS
In this section we give recall the definitions of cq-channels, and of transmission and identification via cq-channels. Furthermore, we review the main results of [30] and [6] .
Cq-channels have a classical sender, having access to an input alphabet X , but their output is quantum, being described by a Hilbert space B. As is customary, we identify the states on B, S(B) with the set of density operators, i.e. the selfadjoint, positive semidefinite, linear operators on B with unit trace:
where Tr ρ = i i |ρ|i for some complete orthonormal basis {|i } i .
Definition 2.1:
where X is a finite set and S(B) the set of quantum states of the complex Hilbert space B, which we assume to be finite dimensional. Furthermore, we denote a = |X | the cardinality of X , and d = |B| the dimension of B.
Associated to W is the channel map on a sequence of length n over the alphabet X .
(Note that to abbreviate, we will customarily omit the superscript ⊗n if the block length is evident from the input string x n .) We call W ⊗n a memoryless channel. In the following, we use the notation In transmission theory, Alice uses the classical-quantum channel to transmit messages from the set X to Bob. He tries to determine the transmitted messages by making a quantum measurement (POVM).
{1, . . . , M}} where the P i are probability distributions on X n and
The rate R of a (n, M, λ)-code is defined as R = 1 n log M. A rate R is said to be achievable if for all η ∈ (0, 1) there exists a n 0 (η), such that for all n ≥ n 0 (η) there exists an (n, 2 n(R−η) , η)-code. The transmission capacity C(W) of a compound cq-channel W is the supremum of all achievable rates, which hence, is the largest achievable rate. One of the main topics in quantum information theory is to determine the transmission capacities of channels.
Let ρ ∈ S(A) be a state of a quantum system A. We denote by S(ρ A ) = S(A) = −Tr ρ A log ρ A the von Neumann entropy. Furthermore, we define the Holevo information I (X :
, and S(W |P) = x∈X P(x)S(W (x)), the conditional entropy of the channel output for the input distribution P. Theorem 2.4 ( [26] , [35] ): The classical transmission capacity of the cq-channel W , defined as
is given by
Furthermore, the strong converse holds [34] , [42] :
In [41] , more properties and results about transmitting classical information over quantum channels are discussed.
A. Identification via cq-Channels
Compared to transmission, in identification theory we change the goal for Bob: We assume that he "only" wants to know if the transmitted message is equal to some j . Definition 2.5:
} where the P i are probability distributions on X n and the D i are POVM elements, i.e. 0 ≤ D i ≤ ½,
The largest size N of an (n, N,
We use a stochastic encoder for the encoding of the messages; this is essential in the theory of identification. The definition of an ID-code only partially fits the definition of a classical identification code in the following sense. There are applications of classical identification codes, where one assumes that there are several receivers, each only interested in one message, and all wanting to decide individually if "their" message was sent. The example given in [4] is that of N sailors on a ship, and each sailor is related to one relative. On a stormy night, one sailor drowns in the ocean. One could now broadcast the name of the sailor to all relatives. However, this takes log 2 N bits. And the news is of interest only to one relative. If we now allow a certain error probability, we can broadcast an identification code using only O(log 2 log 2 N) bits.
The ID-code for a quantum channel has the property that the received state cannot be used in general to ask for two different messages. The reason is that the POVMs (D i , ½−D i ) are in general not compatible. Therefore the realisation of applications with more than one receiver, like in the example above, is not possible with an ID-code as defined. There are, however, applications where we have only two parties, who want to check if they have the same text (such as watermarking, or in the communication complexity setting). Löber [30] defined simultaneous ID-codes to overcome this limitation. In this code model, there has to be one single measurement which allows us to identify every message at the same time.
Definition 2.6: 
sequentially in some order. That this is not a bad idea follows from the gentle measurement lemma [42] : since each measurement has a high probability of giving the correct outcome, the state is disturbed, but only "a little" in trace norm, so we can subject the next measurement as if nothing had happened at all.
The best analysis of this approach is using Sen's noncommutative union bound [36] in the version of Wilde for general POVMs [40] . Using this bound, we can see that if we have any ID-code with errors λ 1 , λ 2 ≤ λ, then we can correctly identify any set of k ≤ ε 2 4λ messages, with error probability bounded by ε. This will not include all messages, since for the rates below the capacity, the error λ can be made to vanish exponentially we get at least an exponentially large k.
In the present paper we consider the identification capacity of a cq-channel, of which we distinguish a priori simultaneous and non-simultaenous flavours, following Löber [30] :
Definition 2.8: The (simultaneous) classical ID-capacity of a cq-channel W is defined as
respectively. Löber [30] showed that for cq-channels, the simultaneous classical ID capacity is equal to the transmission capacity. Furthermore, he showed that the strong converse holds for simultaneous ID-codes. Later, Ahlswede and Winter [6] extended the strong converse to non-simultaneous ID-codes.
Theorem 2.9 ( [30] , [6] ): For any cq-channel W ,
, and the strong converse holds: for all λ 1 + λ 2 < 1,
Ahlswede and Winter also considered the case of a general (quantum-quantum) channel, but the results are much less complete. It is not even clear if in the general case the simultaneous capacity and the non-simultaneous ID-capacity coincide. See the subsequent papers [24] and the review [43] for a presentation of the state of the art. Definitions 2.5 and 2.6 address Freeman Dyson's critique on the status quo of experiments, measurements, and detectors in particle physics (of course in our setting of operational tasks). According to Dyson, experiments as currently conducted in particle physics, can only answer very specific questions. Analogous to our model, this corresponds to identification codes (Definition 2.5), and in particular the use of messagedependent measurements. In comparison, the simultaneous identification codes provide universal measurements so that the relevant questions can be answered by classical postprocessing.
We will also show that the same performance can be achieved with this code concept as with fully general identification codes. Of course, particle physics applications do not have the luxuryŁž of being able to control the encoding in general.
III. IDENTIFICATION VIA ROBUST CQ-CHANNELS
In this section we will define the identification capacity of a compound cq-channel and derive its single-letter formula. In [32] and [18] , the transmission capacity was derived. We will use the transmission code and build an identification code with the method introduced in [5] . This method was also used in [30] to get the identification capacity of a cq-channel. For the converse we generalize the method of [6] .
Definition 3.1: Let be an index set, X a finite set and B a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Let W t : X −→ S(B) be a cq-channel for every t ∈ :
The memoryless extension of the cq-channel W t is given by
) consisting of pairs of stochastic encodings given by code word probability distributions P m over X n and positive semi-definite
The number M is called the size of the code, and λ the error probability. The maximum M for given n and λ is denoted M(n, λ), extending the definition for a cq-channel (which is recovered for | | = 1).
The capacity of W is defined as before,
Thus an (n, M, λ)-code for the compound cq-channel W ensures that the maximal error probability for all channels W t is uniformly bounded above by λ. A more intuitive description of the compound cq-channel is that the sender and receiver do not know which channel from the set W is actually used during the transmission of the n-block; their prior knowledge is merely that the channel is memoryless and belongs to the set W. Their task is to prepare for the worst case among those.
Theorem 3.3 ( [8]):
Let W be a compound cq-channel with finite input alphabet X and finite-dimensional output Hilbert space B. Then, C(W) = max
We stress that we explicitly allow stochastic encoders in the definition. It is known that this does not change the capacity compared to deterministic encoders, although it makes it easier for us to relate later channel models to compound cq-channel coding results. Note however, that this change implies that the average error probability criterion and the maximum error criterion lead to the same achievable rates, and so the strong converse does not hold any more, only the weak converse.
where the P i are probability distributions on X n and the D i
The largest size of an (n, N,
Analogous to previous definitions, we also have simultaneous ID-codes and the maximum code size
The identification capacities are defined as before. All capacities in this paper are defined in the so-called pessimistic way. The optimistic definition of capacity isC(W) = inf λ>0 lim sup n→∞ 1 n log M(n, λ). We show that the converse holds for the optimistic definition and therefore also for the pessimistic definition.
Theorem 3.5: Let W be an arbitrary compound cq-channel with finite input alphabet X and finite-dimensional output Hilbert space B. Then,
and the weak converse holds for the optimistic ID-capacity. Indeed,
Proof . We will use an (n, M, λ)-code for the compound channel to construct an (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ID-code. We use the following lemma from [30] , which is a slightly modified version of the original in [4] : Lemma 3.6 ( [30] ): Let M be a finite set of cardinality M and let λ ∈ (0, 1). Let ε > 0 be small enough so that λ log 2 ( 
By definition of the transmission capacity, there is an 
We construct a simultaneous ID-code
. . , N} by taking as P i the uniform distribution on sets C i {c m : m ∈ A i }, and as D i the sum of the corresponding E m 's:
We choose λ 1 ≥ λ and λ 2 ≥ 2λ. It is now straightforward to bound the errors:
where we have used |A i ∩ A j | < λ εM . Therefore we have shown
It remains to prove the converse, i.e.
For this, consider an arbitrary (non-simultaneous) (n,
1. The first step follows by applying the theory of types. Fix a δ-net T ⊂ P(X ) on the probability distributions on X , i.e. for any p.d. P there exists a Q ∈ T with
It is known that such a net can be chosen with |T | ≤ c δ |X | for a constant c > 0. This induces a partition of the input space X n = Q∈T A Q in such a way that the type (i.e. the empirical distribution) of each x n ∈ A Q is δ-close to Q. Now we can write each distribution P i as
where μ i is a p.d. over T and the P i Q are p.d.'s over A Q (extended trivially to all of X n ). Choose an ε-net M ⊂ P(T ) which can be found with |M| ≤ c ε |T | . Then there exists a μ ∈ M such that at least a fraction of 1 |M| of the messages has its μ i ε-close to μ: w.l.o.g.,
Now modify the code as follows:
If λ 1 + λ 2 < 1, we can choose ε small enough to ensure that
Modify the code once more by truncating all other contributions Q ∈ T , i.e. consider the code {(
Since the encodings are a small, but not too-small fraction of the P i , the error probabilities can increase significantly, but we can control them. Concretely, the new code has errors of the first and second kind, λ 1 = |T |λ 1 and λ 2 = |T |λ 2 , respectively. Since we are in the weak converse regime of λ 1 + λ 2 → 0 asymptotically, we can choose ε → 0 sufficiently slowly so that λ 1 + λ 2 → 0 too, and hence for each δ > 0, λ 1 + λ 2 → 0. As we selected a fraction of the messages that is going to zero arbitrarily slowly, we have the same asymptotic rate.
3. At this point we are in a good position: all the code distributions P i = P i Q are supported on A Q , which is a subset of the δ-typical sequences (in the sense of frequency typicality). Which means we can apply the converse proof from [6] to each W t ∈ W, t ∈ , obtaining
the latter terms occurring because the types of sequences in A Q fluctuate up to δ around Q. This completes it, since we can choose δ > 0 arbitrarily small, and as explained above, ε can be made to go to 0 arbitrarily slowly. Hence,
concluding the proof.
IV. SECURE IDENTIFICATION VIA WIRETAP CQQ-CHANNELS
An important aspect in information theory is security, or privacy. Wyner [45] introduced the classical wiretap channel, which he solved in the degraded case, and later Csiszár and Körner [20] in the general case. It can be described by two channels from the sender ("Alice") to the legal receiver ("Bob") and to the eavesdropper ("Eve"), respectively. In transmission theory the goal is to send messages to the legal receiver, while the wiretapper is to be kept ignorant. The wiretap channel was generalized to the setting of quantum information theory in [19] , [21] . Formally, in contrast to the classical case, quantumly the channel has to be described by a single quantum operation T , from Alice to the joint system of Bob and Eve together: then we can define the legal channel W = Tr B • T and the wiretapper channel V = Tr E • T . Note that (unlike the classical case) this pair of channels cannot be arbitrary! This has to do with the no-cloning theorem: Alice's input state cannot be duplicated and then sent through both channels.
However, here we will restrict ourselves to the cq-channel case, where Alice's input is described by a letter x ∈ X from a finite alphabet. Then we can define the classical-quantum wiretap channel in a simple way.
Definition 4.1: A classical-quantum wiretap channel (wiretap cqq-channel) is a pair (W, V ) of two discrete memoryless cq-channels W : X −→ S(B) and V : X −→ S(E). When
Alice sends a classical input x n ∈ X n , Bob (legal receiver) and Eve (eavesdropper) receive the states W ⊗n (x n ) and
The largest M such that an (n, M, λ, μ)-wiretap code exists is denoted M(n, λ, μ). The secrecy capacity (aka private capacity) of (W, V ) is then defined as
Note that by the Fannes inequality [22] , [44] , the second condition ("privacy") implies that for any random variable J taking values in [M], I (J : E n ) ≤ μn log |E| + h(μ). It turns out that the right hand side can be made arbitrarily small while achieving the capacity, because μ as well as λ can be made to converge to 0 to any polynomial order.
Theorem 4.3 ( [19]):
The secrecy capacity of a wiretap cqq-channel is given by
where the maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships U → X n → B n E n . Thus in the case of transmission theory, we have a positive secrecy capacity C S when the channel parameters of the legal channel are "better" than those of the non-legal channel. This means we pay a price in the form of a smaller rate for secure transmission. We will show that in the case of identification, the situation is different.
where the P i are probability distributions on X n , and the 
which by Helstrom's theorem [25] , [33] means that even if Eve somehow knows that the message can only be either i or j with equal probability, then her error probability for discriminating these two alternatives is at least
For simultaneous wiretap ID-codes we denote the maximum N sim (n, λ 1 , λ 2 , μ). We then define the (simultaneous) secure identification capacity of the wiretap channel as
respectively. In this section we consider the wiretap cqq-channel and derive a multi-letter formula for its secure identification capacity. The idea is similar to the classical case. We use a combination of two codes. For the converse we generalize inequalities of [7] and [23] . 
Proof. For the direct part, the identification code is constructed by means of two fundamental codes, following [5] . Let 0 < ε < C be fixed. We know that there is a δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n there is
for the cq-channel with code size M = 2 n(C(W)−ε) and by Theo-
In Theorem 5.6, the construction for the more general compound model is described. We use the same idea here to show the direct part: Alice and Bob first create shared randomness with the help of the code C at a rate equal to the channel capacity. A code with an arbitrary small positive rate is then sufficient to use the method of Ahlswede and Dueck by sending and decoding the function values. For this purpose we use C .
Furthermore, we have to show that if
We begin with the following two lemmas. To state them, we fix two messages i and j in an (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 , μ) wiretap ID-code, and consider the uniform distribution Q on {i, j }.
We define a new wiretap channel ( W , V ), which has binary input {i, j } and output states in S(B n ) and S(E n ), respectively: it acts by mapping i and j to the input distribution P i and P j on X n , respectively, on which the wiretap cqq-channel (W ⊗n , V ⊗n ) operates then, yielding outputs
then with Q the uniform distribution on {i, j },
Proof . As remarked after Definition 4.4, the condition on F means that
By the inequalities relating trace norm and fidelity [23] , this means that
Invoking furthermore Uhlmann's theorem [27] , [39] , we know that there exist purifications |ϕ i and |ϕ j ∈ B ⊗n ⊗ C of V i and V j , respectively,
Hence, by the data processing inequality,
where we interpret the two states ϕ i and ϕ j as a binary cq-channel. To get the desired upper bound, we need to maximise the right hand side above over all pairs of pure states ϕ i and ϕ j , with F(ϕ i , ϕ j ) = | ϕ i |ϕ j | ≥ 1−μ. This can be done explicitly because it is effectively a two-dimensional problem in the span of the two state vectors. Indeed, due to unitary invariance, we may w.l.o.g. write
where α ≥ β ≥ 0 are real and non-negative and α 2 + β 2 = 1. The fidelity constraint means that |α 2 − β 2 | ≥ 1 − μ, which translates into 2β 2 ≤ μ. On the other hand, the Holevo information reduces to 
Proof. We construct a binary channel with inputs and outputs {i, j }, by performing the binary measurement (D, ½ − D) on the states W x , x ∈ {i, j }, leading to an output y ∈ {i, j } and thus defining a channel T via
By data processing (in fact, the original Holevo bound!), we have
the last by an elementary calculation.
Returning to the converse proof, recall that the existence of identification codes at a positive rate implies the following for the messages:
3) for all i, j ∈ [N] with i = j and any operator F on B ⊗n :
. From the first two properties, it follows by Lemma 4.7 that
By the third property and Lemma 4.6,
Thus if 2h(λ) ≤ 1, which is true for all λ ≤ cf. [23] . To see this, we use a well-known characterisation of the total variational distance (the commutative trace distance):
⊥ . This can be interpreted as a factorisation of the channel V = V 0 • E μ into an erasure channel E μ : {i, j } −→ {i, j, ⊥}, with E μ (x|x) = μ and E μ (⊥ |x) = 1 − μ, and the cq-channel
and we are done.
V. SECURE IDENTIFICATION VIA ROBUST WIRETAP CQQ-CHANNELS
In this section we consider robust and secure cq-channels. The results for transmission capacities can be found in [11] and [13] : In [11] the secrecy of the classical compound channel with quantum wiretapper and channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter was derived. Furthermore, a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of this channel without CSI and the secrecy capacity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel with CSI at the transmitter is determined. In [32] , a multi-letter formula for the secrecy capacity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel is given. We will show that the capacity of a compound wiretap cqq-channel again satisfies a dichotomy theorem.
Definition 5.1: Let and be index sets and let W = {W t : X → S(B) : t ∈ } and V = {V s : X → S(E) : s ∈ } be compound cq-channels. We call the pair (W, V) a compound wiretap cqq-channel. The channel output of W is available to the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the channel output of V is available to the wiretapper (Eve). We may sometimes write the channel as a family of pairs
Definition 5.2: An (n, M, λ) transmission code for the compound wiretap cqq-channel (W t , V s ) t ∈ ,s∈ consists of a family C = (P i , D i ) i∈ [M] where the P i are probability distributions on X n and (
The capacity is defined as before.
Theorem 5.3 ( [13]): The secrecy capacity of a compound wiretap cqq-channel (W, V) is given by
where B t are the resulting random quantum states at the output of legal receiver channels and E s are the resulting random quantum states at the output of wiretap channel. 
We define N(n, λ 1 , λ 2 , μ) as the largest N satisfying the above definition for a given n and set λ 1 , λ 2 , μ of errors.
Definition 5.5: The secure identification capacity C S I D (W, V) of a compound wiretap cqq-channel (W, V) is defined as C S I D (W, V)
Again we get a dichotomy result. Theorem 5.6: Let (W, V) be a compound wiretap cqq-channel. Then,
Proof . For the direct part, the identification code is again constructed by means of two fundamental codes, following Ahlswede and Dueck [5] . Let 0 < ε < C be fixed. We know that there is a δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n there is an (n, M , λ(n))-code for the compound cq-channel
and an ( 
This means that we choose a colouring at random and calculate the corresponding colour of our message. We define the POVMs as
Now we will show by random choice of the family of maps that there exists a family which induces an ID-code for the cq-channel with the desired error probabilities. For i ∈ [N] and j ∈ [M ], take independent random variables U i j with uniform distribution on the set {u j · u k |k ∈ [M ]}. Collecting all RVs for one message i we get the random colour sets
and we will use equidistribution onŪ i (which is a random probability distribution) as encoding distributionQ i for message i . Therefore
The random ID-code for the compound cq-channel is
For errors of the first kind we have for all possible realisations U i ofŪ i
Thus errors of the first kind tend to zero for n → ∞. Now we need to prove that with positive probability we get a code with sufficiently small probability for errors of the second kind. Then there is a realisation with this error probability, and therefore we are done.
We will analyse the overlapping between the U i (which determines the probability for errors of the second kind as we use equidistribution on the U i as encoding distribution for message i ). To do this, we will define a Bernoulli chain counting the intersecting elements between a realisation of U 1 and U 2 : Let U 1 be fixed and define, for j ∈ [M ],
This means that j = 1 iff messages 1 and 2 get the same colour under colouring j . The RVs U 2 j are independent, therefore the j are independent with
Now consider a realisation U 2 ofŪ 2 . We have
This follows immediately from the error bounds of our original transmission codes (3) and (4). If now λ ∈ (0, 1) is given, we get that with positive probability, the events
and max
occur, provided that n is large enough. Therefore there is a realisation U 2 ofŪ 2 for which inequalities (5) and (6) hold, which leads to a code of size two. Repeating this argument for i = 3, . . . , N and upperbounding the probability that the newly selected U i does not fulfil inequalities analogous to (5) and (6) for a certain U j , j ∈ [N − 1] instead of U 1 , by the sum of the probabilities for each U j , we get that an
and hence by Hoeffding's bound
Thus for all λ ∈ (0, 1) and for all ε > 0
As in the classical case, it follows from the construction of the code for the compound wiretap cqq-channel that the wiretapper can not identify the second part of the message, and therefore condition (2) Recall Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 from Section IV, from which we get directly (denoting by Q the uniform distribution on a set {i, j } of two messages):
• If for i = j ∈ [N], it holds for all POVM elements F on B ⊗n and all s ∈ that
• If for i = j ∈ [N], it holds for all t ∈ that
The existence of an ID-wiretap code with positive rate implies the above conditions. Hence, as before, we obtain if λ ≤ 1 15 , then
VI. IDENTIFICATION IN THE PRESENCE OF A JAMMER
In this section we perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying cq-channels, with analogous findings. We point out, however, that we only consider finite index sets throughout this and the following section. Definition 6.1: Let be a finite index set, X a finite set and B a finite-dimensional Hilbert space. Let W t : X −→ S(B) be a cq-channel for every t ∈ :
Let t n ∈ n be a state sequence. The memoryless extension of the cq-channel W t n is given by
In this case a jammer can change the channel during the transmission.
Definition 6.2: An (n, M, λ)-code for the arbitrarily varying cq-channel W is a family
Like in the compound case, here we allow explicitly stochastic encoders. The number M is called the size of the code, and λ the error probability. The maximum M for given n and λ is denoted M(n, λ), extending the definition for a cq-channel (which is recovered for | | = 1). The capacity of W is defined as before,
A more intuitive description of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel is that a jammer tries to prevent the legal parties from communicating properly. He may change his input in every channel use and is not restricted to use a repetitive probabilistic strategy. Quite on the contrary, it is understood that the sender and the receiver have to select their coding scheme first. After that the jammer makes his choice of the sequence of channel states. The sender and receiver do not know which channel from the set W is actually used; their prior knowledge is merely that the channel is memoryless and belongs to the set W. Their task is to prepare for the worst case among those.
Definition 6.3:
We say that the arbitrarily varying cqchannel W = {W t : t ∈ } is symmetrizable if there exists a parametrized set of distributions {τ (·|x) : x ∈ X }, on also known as a channel τ from X to , such that for all
To formulate the capacity theorem of [2] , we need the following notations. For an arbitrarily varying cq-channel W we denote its convex hull by conv(W). It is defined as follows:
Furthermore, we set
This is called the random coding capacity of the channel. Under this notion, the encoding with a stochastic encoder is generalized to a (correlated) random code. It is assumed that the sender and the receiver have access to some source with correlated randomness, which, however, is secret from the jammer. Here we need just the quantity to give the transmission capacity of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel.
Theorem 6.4 ( [2]):
Let W be an arbitrarily varying cq-channel. Then its capacity C(W) is given by An (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ID-code for the arbitrarily varying cq-channel W is a set of pairs
Definition 6.5:
where the P i are probability distributions on X n and the D i are POVM elements, i.e. 0 ≤ D i ≤ ½, acting on B ⊗n , such
The largest size of an (n, N, λ 1 , λ 2 ) ID-code is denoted  N(n, λ 1 , λ 2 ) . Analogous to previous definitions, we have also simultaneous ID-codes and the maximum code size  N sim (n, λ 1 , λ 2 ) .
The identification capacities are now defined as before.
With the help of the method from Theorem 3.5 we can show that the transmission capacity of the channel corresponds to the identification capacity. To do this, in the proof of the direct part we simply use a code for an arbitrary varying cq-channel instead of the code for the compound cq-channel. To show the converse, we show that the error of the first type in the identification can not be arbitrarily small if the channel is symmetrizable. Therefore, we get the following.
Theorem 6.6: Let W be an arbitrarily varying cq-channel. Then its ID-capacity is given by
VII. SECURE IDENTIFICATION IN THE PRESENCE OF A JAMMER
In this section we add a wiretapper to the arbitrarily varying cq-channel. First we define the transmission codes and quote the known transmission capacity. Using this result, we then calculate the secure identification capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel.
Definition 7.1: Let and be finite index sets, and let W = {W t : X → S(B) : t ∈ } and V = {V s : X → S(E) : s ∈ } be arbitrarily varying cq-channels. We call the pair (W, V) an arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel. The channel output of W is available to the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the channel output of V is available to the wiretapper (Eve). We may sometimes write the channel as a family of
Definition 7.2: An (n, M, λ) transmission code for the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel (W t , V s ) t ∈ ,s∈ consists of a family C = (P i , D i ) i∈ [M] , where the P i are probability distributions on X n and (
The capacity is defined as before. To state the result of [15] we again introduce the random coding capacity,
Here, B n t n are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legitimate receiver's channels. E n s n are the resulting quantum states at the output of the wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships: U → X n → B n t n E n s n . X n is here a random variable taking values in X n , U a random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution p U . In [15] the following dichotomy is shown.
Theorem 7.3 ( [15]):
Let C S (W, V) denote the capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel (W, V). Then,
As in the previous section, we can now use a similar proof technique to determine the secure identification capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel. We start by defining the identification codes. 
Definition 7.5: The identification capacity C S I D (W, V) of an arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel (W, V) is defined as
Again we show a dichotomy result, using the idea of Theorem 5.6. As fundamental codes we use for C a code for the arbitrarily varying cq-channel and for C a code for the arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channel, both reaching the capacity. If the transmission capacity for C is positive, we get as an identification capacity the transmission capacity of C . The security follows by the strong secrecy condition like in Theorem 5.6. Also the converse follows the same idea. Therefore we get the following.
Theorem 7.6 (Dichotomy): Let C(W) be the capacity of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel W and let C S (W, V) be the secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap cq-channel (W, V). Then,
In this theorem the capacity is a single letter formula, but the condition if the capacity is positive is given by the multi-letter formula for the random coding secret capacity.
Remark 7.7: In the case of transmission it is possible to avoid the capacity being zero if the channel is symmetrizable, if we allow the sender and receiver to use common randomness. With this resource the capacity will not change if the channel is non-symmetrizable, but if the channel is symmetrizable then the capacity may go up from zero to the random coding capacity.
The situation appears different in the case of identification. We can, of course, use the same resource to get rid of the vanishing capacity in the symmetrizable case. However, note that a positive rate of common randomness, by the concatenated code construction of Ahlswede and Dueck [5] , increases the ID-capacity by the same amount. Fortunately, it comes to our rescue the fact that whenever common randomness is required to achieve the random coding capacity for transmission, then a rate of asymptotically zero is sufficient [1] . Thus, we could define random coding capacities with zero rate of common randomness without changing the notion for transmission, while obtaining a sound capacity concept for the identification problem.
VIII. CONTINUITY AND SUPER-ADDITIVITY
In [16] we discussed the continuity and super-additivity for the identification capacity of a classical compound channel and a classical compound wiretap channel. It turns out that the results for the capacity of the classical-quantum case are completely analogous. Therefore we just list the results here and discuss them as briefly as possible.
A. Distance Between cq-Channels
First we need a metric to measure the distance between two cq-channels.
Definition 8.1: Let W, W : X −→ S(B) be two cq-channels. The distance between them is defined as
where · 1 denotes the trace norm.
Next, we extend this concept to the compound and arbitrarily varying case.
Definition 8.2: Let W = (W t ) t ∈ and W = ( W s ) s∈ be two compound or arbitrarily varying cq-channels with input alphabet X and let
Then we define the distance between the two cq-channels as
Obviously, it is desirable to have a continuous behaviour of the capacity, meaning that small variations in the channel (i.e. the set W) set should only lead to small variations in the corresponding capacity. Let W(X , S(B)) be the family of all compound cq-channels W = (W t ) t ∈ with W t : X −→ S(B), with respect to the above metric D. We use the distance definition to define continuity for points and functions in the usual way.
Similarly, for wiretap cqq-channels (W, V), the metric to measure the distance between two wiretap cqq-channels is as follows.
Definition 8.3: Let (W, V ) and ( W , V ) be two wiretap cqq-channels with the same input alphabet X , then we define
If (W, V) and ( W, V) are two compound/arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels with the same input alphabet X . Then we define
The notions of the (dis-)continuity points are as usual. We also consider parallel (i.e. tensor product) channels, which means that they map pair of inputs independently to a tensor product of the output systems: define W ⊗ W as the set of channels
Let W be a compound cq-channel. From Theorem 3.5, we know that
This is a continuous function of W and therefore the following holds.
Corollary 8.4: C I D is a continuous function on W(X , S(B)).
Regarding the additivity, we can once more use Theorem 3.5. It follows immediately that Corollary 8.5: For any two compound cq-channels W and W,
Definition 8.6:
We say that a capacity C is super-additive if we can find two channels (W, V ) and ( W , V ) such that
The following theorem characterizes the discontinuity points of C S I D completely. It also shows that the set of discontinuity points is never empty. 
The proof follows the same idea as the proof for the classical case in [16, Th. 6 
The identification capacity of a compound cq-channel is additive and therefore not super-additive. It follows by its operational definition that for the message transmission capacity and for the message transmission secrecy capacity, inequality (7) holds with "≥".
By the same argument, we can show that the same also holds for the secure identification capacity.
Proposition 8.9: For any two wiretap cqq-channels (W, V ) and ( W , V ),
Proof . This follows from the coding theorem.
The following theorem gives a complete characterization of the super-additivity behaviour of C S I D .
Theorem 8.10: 
The proof follows the same idea as the proof for the classical case [16, Th. 6.3] .
As before, we find a large number of discontinuity points. Now we characterize the super-additivity of these channels. Theorem 8.10 can be generalized for compound wiretap cqq-channels. Furthermore, we consider the sharpest form of super-additivity, that is, super-activation. Definition 8.12: We say that a capacity C can be super-activated if we can find two cqq-channels (W, V) and The analysis of the transmission capacities of the arbitarily varying cq-channels and arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels has been done in [12] and [13] . There we showed that the transmission random coding capacity of the arbitrarily varying cq-channel is continuous.
To give a complete characterization of the discontinuity points of the capacity as in [17] , let us introduce the set N = {W finite and symmetrizable}.
Note that being symmetrizable is a closed condition, hence N is a closed set under the convergence induced by the metric D. With this, we can give a complete characterization of the discontinuity points of the capacity, just as in [17] .
Theorem 8.14: The capacity C I D (W) is discontinuous at the finite cq-AVC W iff the following conditions hold: 
We define the variance of
and furthermore, let
where the sup is taken over all {W n } and W that satisfy (8 
The next result shows that the ID capacity is super-additive. Theorem 8.18: Let W 1 and W 2 be two arbitrarily varying cq-channels. Then,
iff exactly one of the two channels W 1 , W 2 is symmetrizable while the other one is not, and both random coding capacities are positive,
Now we will analyze the continuity of C S I D for arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels. In Theorem 7.6 we showed that To end, we fully characterize the occurrence of super-activation and super-additivity for C S I D . Of course, super-activation is the most powerful form of super-additivity, in this case two channels each with capacity zero combine to one with positive capacity.
It is known that C I D cannot be super-activated. V 2 ) be two arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels for which no super-activation occurs. Then, for these two channels, super-additivity of C S I D applies iff C S I D (W 1 , V 1 ) > 0 and C S (W 2 , V 2 ) = 0 but C ran (W 2 ) > 0, or analogously with 1 and 2 interchanged.
In [12] , super-activation has been shown for the transmission capacity of the classical arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, and in [14] , a full characterization have been given.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have extended the theory of identification via quantum channels to include realistic considerations of robustness and security. The former we modelled by channel uncertainty in both compound and arbitrarily varying cq-channels, the latter by considering wiretap channels. We considered these additions of robustness and secrecy constraints separately, and eventually both of them together. These notions generalize the ones presented in [16] for classical channels, and we found capacity characterizations quite analogous to those of [16] . There we have also given applications for using ID-codes in the secure and robust setting; these applications evidently extend to cq-channels.
The first, visible difference in the results resides in the fact that while the classical theory in all variants essentially yields single-letter formulas, the analogues for quantum channels are to a large part multi-letter formulas that elude efficient computation, as already seen in the case of cq-channels considered here, let alone for general quantum channels.
Secondly, as has been stressed from the beginning of the theory of identification via quantum channels, it comes naturally in two flavours, simultaneous [30] and non-simultaneous [6] identification. This is because in quantum mechanics the different tests for the various messages correspond to measurements that are not necessarily compatible, which is an entirely non-classical phenomenon. Since it has an additional constraint on the decoder, the simultaneous ID-capacity is always upper bounded by the non-simultaneous ID-capacity; thus, it is desirable to prove the direct coding theorems for the former, and the converses for the latter. We do this here, and find that simultaneous and non-simultaneous ID-capacities coincide in all the models considered, generalizing the result of [6] for ideally known and secrecy-free cq-channels. It should be noted, however, that for general quantum channels, a gap between simultaneous and non-simultaneous ID-capacities is expected, cf. [43] .
The converses for the non-simultaneous ID-capacities are considerably more difficult than their classical and simultaneous analogues. As a matter of fact, those can be obtained by general information spectrum and resolvability methods, while the converses and dichotomy theorems of the non-simultaneous cq-versions require genuine quantum generalizations of resolvability ideas, as is already evident in the matrix concentration bounds from [6] . In the present paper, an interesting case is that of the compound channel (Theorem 3.5), where the converse proof is specifically adapted to the channel model, and it follows a completely different idea from the one known for classical channels. Another manifestation of the different character of classical and quantum information is the form of the maximum mutual information of a cq-channel with two output states μ-close in trace norm (Lemma 4.6). We need this technical bound to argue that ID-secrecy implies wiretap communication secrecy. While in Remark 4.8 it is shown that for classical channels this maximum information is precisely μ (cf. also [7] ), the analysis for cq-channels is not only much more involved, it also only yields a very different-looking upper bound. We wish to highlight it as an interesting open problem to determine precisely what the optimal upper bound in Lemma 4.6 is.
Finally, Holger Boche thanks Freeman Dyson for comments on related issues on particle physics and computation, and the IAS Princeton for its hospitality.
